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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Recent Legislation
CRImINAL LAw-BOMBING-The recent use of high-powered explosives
by extortionists and gangsters has called forth a new statute from the
Missouri Legislature. Mo. Laws 1929, p. 165. It defines the crime of bomb-
ing and imposes a penalty for its commission. The statute reads, "The will-
ful and malicious explosion of any bomb or other device charged with pow-
der or other explosives is hereby declared to be and defined as bombing."
And, "Whoever shall willfully and maliciously explode or who willfully and
maliciously aids, counsels, or causes to be exploded any bomb or other de-
vice charged with powder or other explosive, whereby any person is or may
be put in danger of bodily injury or death, shall be deemed guilty of bomb-
ing, and upon conviction thereof shall suffer death or be imprisoned in the
state penitentiary for a term of not less than two years." Another new
Missouri statute covers the malicious destruction of property by ex-
plosives, and makes such offense a felony. Mo. Laws 1929, p. 169, repealing
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 3384.
Other states have had statutes of this same general scope for several
years, but none have been as inclusive as the new Missouri statutes. Most
of them cover damage to property only. Some few include injuries to
persons. In Ohio, for example, the act prohibits the possession and carry-
ing of bombs and explosives with the intent to use the same unlawfully
against the person or property of another. Ohio Code (Page, 1926) secs.
5903-19. In New York the endangering of life by maliciously placing an
explosive near a building is a felony. N. Y. Laws 1923, sec. 1895. Illi-
nois also has an act to punish persons for destroying property, or inflict-
ing injury to persons by such destruction with bombs and explosives. R. S.
fl. (Cahill, 1929) c. 38 secs. 56-59.
In 1929 four states in addition to Missouri legislated against the use of
bombs and other explosive devices to injure persons or property. Mary-
land added dwellings to the buildings which it is a felony to destroy or
injure with dynamite. Md. Laws 1929, c. 405. Pennsylvania provides for
punishment of persons who have bombs in their possession, or whlo attempt
to use explosives for the injury of persons or property. Pa. Laws 1929, c.
330. In Oregon punishment is provided if any person shall purposely and
maliciously and with intent to injure the person or property of another,
set off or explode, any bomb, dynamite, powder or other explosive. Ore.
Laws 1929, c. 408. The Kansas statute provides, "Any person who shall
have in his possession or control any cartridge, shell or bomb or similar
device, charged or filled with one or more explosives intending to use the
same or cause the same to be used for an unlawful purpose, or attempts
to use it to the injury of persons or property . . . shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor." Kan. Laws 1929, c. 171. In passing, it should be noted
that Kansas is the only state which makes the offense of bombing less than
a felony.
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Legislation of this type often defeats its own purpose by being hastily
and inefficiently drawn up. The Missouri act merits this criticism. A
"bomb" is said to be any device charged with powder or other explosive.
This description is inclusive enough to cover all kinds and sizes of ex-
plosives, even down to small firecrackers. The wording of the Oregon
statute is subject to the same criticism. Is it possible that such a relatively
insignificant offense as maliciously exploding a firecracker and causing per-
sonal injury should be considered as bombing, and be punished as a felony,
conviction for which is punished by a sentence of from two years in the
penitentiary to death? The Ohio and Kansas statutes, which apply only
to "any cartridge, shell, bomb or similar device," seem to be more intelli-
gently drafted than the Missouri enactment; but it is probable that the lat-
ter, by discerning application, will satisfactorily accomplish its purpose.
C. F. M., '31.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-REGULATION or BARBERs.-In or-
der to practice the "art" of barbering in Illinois, one must now attend a
qualified barber college for 1248 hours, as well as undergo a period of ap-
prenticeship lasting two and one-half years. Ill. Laws 1919, p. 189. The
idea of barber colleges is not a new one, but attendance at them has been
accepted heretofore in lieu of, rather than in addition to, apprenticeship.
Ill. Laws 1909, p. 98; Mo. Laws 1921, p. 156. Barbering has assumed the
dignity of a profession. The Legislature of Illinois so refers to it in its
enactments.
Courts have generally held that acts providing for the examination,
licensing and regulation of barbers are a valid exercise of the police power
to adopt regulations for the health, comfort and well-being of society, and
not void as an abridgment of the liberty and natural rights of citizens.
State v. Walker (1907) 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac. 775. The test usually laid
down is whether the restrictions imposed by the statute are reasonable.
There can be little doubt that twenty-five years ago the statute in the
present case would have been held to impose unreasonable restrictions.
Barbering was then merely a trade, and all that an ambitious man needed
to enter it were instruments and some sense of symmetry. But along with
the growing consciousness in the trade of the dignity of its calling came
a widening conception on the part of the courts of what are reasonable re-
quirements for its practice. There can be little doubt, then, of the consti-
tutionality of the present statute on this particular point, especially in
view of the decision upholding the prior Illinois statute. Ill. Laws 1909,
p. 98. In that case the court said: "Three years seems a long time to re-
quire for learning the trade of a barber, but we cannot say that it is so
unreasonably long as to constitute an unreasonable restriction upon the
right to engage in the trade." People v. Logan (1918) 284 Iln. 83, 119 N.
E. 913. P. S. A., '31.
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